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I.

1NTRODUCT!ON

Recently, several distinguished commentators have asked how, if at all, the
U.S. Supreme Court will speak, after its same sex marriage ruling, 2 to interstate
inequalities involving the federal constitutional rights of childcaring parents. 3
Professor Emeritus, Northern Illinois University College of uiw. B.A., Colby
College; J.D., The University of Chicago. Thanks to Matthew Timko, Academic Technologies
and Outreach Services LibrariHn, and Alex Yorko, 2L, each at NIU College of Law. All errors
are mine.
2. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
l See, e.g., Serena Mayeri, Foundling Fathers: (Non-) Marriage and Parental Rights
in the Age of Equality, 125 YALE L.J. 2292, 2392 (2016) [hereinafter Foundling Fathers]
("How, if at all, the Constitution will speak to burgeoning inequalities between marital and
nonmarital families in this new age of marriage equality remains to be seen."). F.ar!ier she
explored how "marital supremacy" in childcare settings has carried a "steep price" for unwed
parents involving "equality, freedom and dignity"; Serena Mayeri, Marital Supremacy and the
Conslitution of 1he Nonmarital Family, 103 CALIF. L REV. 1277, 1351 (2015). See also
Douglas NcJaime, Marri!JgeEquaiityandthe New Parenthood, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1185, 1266
(2016) [hereinafter New Parenthood] ("[B)y validating the modd of parenthood central to
same-sex family formation [i.e., intentional and functional parenthood], maniage equality can
provide a precedent on which to justify the expansion of that model not only inside but also
outside marriage, for both same-sex and different-sex relationships."). Professor Joslin agrees
(Courtney G. Joslin, Marriage Equality and Its Relationship to Family law, 129 HARV. L.
REv. F. 197, 211 (2016) ("Marriage equality, NeJaime argues, may result in greater protections
not just for marital parents but for nonmarital parents. I agree with Ne.Jaime ... l think ...
Obergefcll opens up the possibility of rethinking the maniage/nonmarriage divide that
continues to shape the law ... of parentage.")). Professor Cahill finds the U.S. Supreme
Court's same-sex maniage equality case evisions a comparable "constitutional norm" of
equality in the "'related rights' of childrearing and procreation." Courtney Megan Ci1hill,
Obergefell and the 'New' Reproduction, 100 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 1, 6 (2016) (quoting
Obergcfoll v. Hodges, I 35 S. Ct. 2584, 2599). See also Courtney Megan Cahi II, Reproduction
Reconceived, 10 I MINN. L REv. 617, 623 (20 l 6) ("Article ... asks how marriage equality
might constrain emerging proposals to regulate the practice of alternative reproductiou. "). But
Dean Murray is less optimistic, finding Obergefell "furn ishcs little basis for challenging" the
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Sp~cifically, Professor Mayeri notes that today the "con~titutional law of the
family stands at a critical turning point," leaving us to ponder whether the
"advent of marriage equality," which "disrupted conventional definitions of
parenthood" by demoting "marriage and biology in favor of more intent-based
and functional criteria," will heighten or diminish the federal "constitutional
significance of marital status" in parentage matters. 4 Professor NeJamie worries
that Obergefell "may reduce incentives to achieve laws that recognize unmarried,
nonbiological parents,") though there is the "potential" for it to "yield more
robust recognition for some unmarried parents."6 And Dean Murray, while
recognizing this "potential,"7 worries Obergefell may not be read to "sanction
and facilitate ... methods of family formation ... that credit nonmarriage."&
The same sex m.-irriage equality ruling did not directly address any issues
involving national parentage equality. Tt is not likely the ruling will prompt the
U.S. Supreme Court lo address national parentage equality any time soon. The
Court has historically deferred to state parentage laws while recognizing their
significant interstate variations.
While interstate parental childcare equality issues are important, they pale
in significance to issues of intrastate equality for marital and biological parents,
as well as for nonmarital, nonbiological, nonadoptive parents who care for
children and who are often deemed de facto or presumed parents, which can
include grandparents and/or stepparents. Herein, I offer a few thoughts on
intrastate parental childcare equality9 after explaining why interstate inequalities
will likely remain unaddressed by the U.S. Supreme Court. 10
marital/nonmarital "inequality" in state laws that "specifically limit gestational surrogacy to
married couples." Melissa Murray, Obergefell v. Hodges and Nonmarriage Inequality, I 04
CALIF. L. REV. t 207, 1254-55 (2016) [hereinafter Nonmarriage Inequality]. But see Joanna L.
Grossman, Parentage Without Gender, 17 CARDOZO J OF CONfLICT R.EsOL. 717, 747 (2016)
(concluding "Obergefell's most important contribution 10 parentage law may be simply to
provoke the scrutiny we should already have given it.").
4. Foundling Fathers, supra note 2, at 2301-02.
5. New Parenthood, supra note 2, at 1252.
6. New Parenthood, supra note 2, at 1253.
7. Nonmarriage Equality, supra note 2, at l 252.
8. Nonmarriage Equality, supra note 2, al 1254.
9. While the same sex marriage ruling was seemingly founded on both the Equal
Protection and Due Process Clauses, Peter Nicolas, Fundamenlal Rights ill a fost-Obergefelt
World, 27 YALE J. OF L. AND FEMINISM 331, 331 (2016), any Due Process analysis should not
impact significantly my assessments of intrastate federal equality issues. See, e.g., Henderson
v. Adams, 209 F. Supp. 3d 1059 (SD. Ind, 2016) (finding both eqm1lity and due process
safeguar<ls violated when marital parentage presumption favored husbands, but. not wives, of
childcaring birth mothers employing assisted reproduction), clarified by Henderson v. Adams,
No. l I5CV00220TWPMJD, 2016 WL 749247, at *4 (S.D. Incl. Dec. 30, 2016) (ruling applies
whether or not anonymous sperm donor employed; marital presumption here is rebuttable
under "same methods" as used when husbands seek rebuttal).
IO. Neither intrastate nor interstate differences in parentage issues beyond defining
parents for childcare purposes are significantly addressed herein. There are important
interstate differences on wt10 is the parent for such other purposes as adoption participation,
child support, and inheritance. See, e.g., Paula A. Monopoli, Inheritance law and the Marital
Presumption After Obergefel I, 8 EST. PLAN. AND COMMUNITY PROP. L.J. 437 (2016) (arguing
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fOSl'l:RING INTERSTATE INEQUALITY ON CHIL!JCARE PARENTAGE

Equal parental childcare rights across the country have never been
demanded by the U.S. Supreme Court, whether parentage occurs in or outside of
marriage. And equal parental childcare rights will not soon be demanded,
notwithstanding the same-sex marriage equality ruling. However, equal parental
childcare rights within individual states are required. Yet it is commonplace for
intrastate inequalities to go unrecognized.
Unlike other federal constitutional rightsholders,'' a parent with the federal
constihltional right to exercise "care, custody, and control" over a child is subject
to significant, though not exclusive, state definitional h1wmaking. While federal
constitutional childcaring parents may be defined by state constitutional law
precedents, more often the definitions arise from state statutes and Lheir case
precedents or from state court precedents untethered to stahltes. 12 The balance
hetween state legislative and untethered judicial authority over federal
constitutional childcare parentage definitions varies interstate, 13 as well as
intrastate depending upon how childcare parentage is establishcd. 14 At times,
whether by statutes or precedents, childcare parentage is defined, inter alia, by

Obergefcll mandates extension of current marital pc1rentage presumptions to same-sex,
nonbirth/nongenetic spouses in inheritance law). There are important, possibly troublesome,
differences in the applications of these definitions in childcare settings. See, e.g., Jessica
Feinberg, Consideration of Genetic Connections in Child Custody Disputes Between SameSex Parents: Fair or FouU, 81 Mo. L REV. 331 (2016) (advocating prohibitions on
discrimination against nongcnetic contributors involving children born of assisted
reproduction).
11. Outside of parental childcare, other federal constitutional rights holders are
generally uniform across state borders. The criminally accused, whose rights include effective
assistance of counsel, jury trial, and speedy trial, do not vary widely interstate. U.S. CONST.
amend. VI. See, e.g., Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 ( 1967) (speedy trial right applies
in state criminal cases). Nor do religious practitioners. U.S. CONST. amend. I, as read in
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (l 940) (like Congress, states may not enact laws
prohibiting the free exercise of religion). Nor do those subject only to reasonable searches.
lJS. CONST. amend. JV, as read in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (exclusionary ru!e
applicable in state criminal case).
12. See, e.g., 1effrey A. Parness, Parentage Law (R)Evolut io11: The Key Questions, 59
WAYNE L. RE.V. 743, 752-63 (2013) [hereinafter Parentage Law (R)EvolutionJ (oveTView of
statutory and common law developments).
13. See, e.g, Jeffrey A. Parness, Stale lawmaking on Federal Consti!ulio11al Childcare
Parents: More Principled Allocations of Powers and More Rational Distinctions, 50
CREIGlffON L. R.t:v. 479 (2013) [hereinafter Stat<> Lawmaking) (reviewing concerns by judges
with separation of powers limits on judicial lawmaking involving matters of childcare
parentage),
14. E.g., consider that in some states the marital parentage presumptions arc established
by statute, while nonmarital parentage presumptions (as by developing a parental-like
relationship and holding out a child as one's own) arc established through common law. See
e.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 24.J (McKinney 2017) ("effect of marriage on legitimacy of
children") and Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth A.CC., 6 I N.E.3d 488, 490, 493 (N.Y. 2016) (child
custody statute outside of marriage uses term "parent," which is left "to be defined by the
courts"; statute is now read to include one who "agreed to conceive a child and to raise the
child together" with the birth mother though one is neither a biological or adoptive parent).
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actual biological ties; imagined, but not nctual, biological ties (ns with marital
paternity presumptions); contracts; and/or earlier parental-like acts.
Broad state lawmaking discretion on definirig who an~ childcare parents
under the lederal constitution emanates from three major U.S. Supreme Comt
precedents. In Lehr v. Robertson, an unwed biological father of a child born of
sex to an unwed mother sought lo participate in (and have an opportunity to veto)
that child's later adopiion. 15 The adoption was pursued by the mother's new
husband. The Court recognized that state lawmakers could vary their standards
on denying such a father any participation rights. While the Court recognized
that the "intangible fibers that connect parent and chil<l" through biology "are
sufficiently vital to merit constitutional protection in appropriate cases," it
concluded that in "the vast majority of cases, state law determines the final
outcome" when resolving "the legal problems arising from the parent-child
relationship." 16 Before and since Lehr, American states have varied widely on
what participation rights of unwed biological fathers arise in formal adoption
proceedings. 17
Another precedent is Michael Ii. v. Gerald D., where an unwed biological
father of a child born of sex to a married woman sought to undo a state law
favoring a presumption of paternity in the husband. 18 The Court ruled that
California could deny, as it then wished, the biological father any opportunity
interest in establishing childcare parentage where the married couple wished to
remain an intact nuclear family. 19 While California public policy has since
changed,20 in Pennsylvania a comparable biological father can still be thwarted
in pursuing legal parentage at least by an intact nuclear family. 21 Both before and
15. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 250 (1983).
16. Id. at 256 (citing United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 35 I -53 ( J 966)) and by
saying "rules governing ... child custody are generally specified in statutory enactments that
vary from state to state." Jn Yazcll, where no federal constitutional protections were asserted,
the court found "no need for uniformity" and that "solicitude for state interests, particularly in
the field of family ... should be overridden by the federal courts only where clear and
substantial interests of the National Government ... wi II suffer major damage if state law is
applied." Yazcll, 382 U.S. at 352,357
17. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Pa mess, Participalion ofUnwed Biological Faihers in Newborn

Adoptions: Achieving Substantive and Procedural Fairness, 5 J.L. ANO FAM. STUD. 223 (2003)
(critically reviewing state laws) and Comment, Kimberly Barton, Who's Your Daddy?: Stale
Adoption S!atutes and the Unknown Biological Father, 32 CAP. U. L. REY. 113 (2003)
(suggesting bct1er ways to notify biological fathers when their children are placed for

adoption).
18. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. I l 0, 113 ( 1989).
I9. id. at 129 (Scalia, J,, plurality opinion). The ruling was applied against a biological
father who had "an established parental relationship." Id. at 123.
20. CAL. FAM. ConE § 7541 (a) (Deering 2017) (rebutted with "evidence based on blood
tests").
21. Strauser v. Stahr, 726 A.2d 1'052, 1052, 1055 (Pa. 1999) (biological fathers cannot
seek to rebut marital presumption favoring paternity in husband as long as marriage is intact
11nd spouses want to mc1intain presumption). See generally Paula Roberts, TruJh and
Consequences: Par/ II. Que.l'tioning the Paternity of Mari/al Children, 37 FAM. L.Q. 55
(2003 ), including Paula Roberts, Truth and Consequences: Part If. Questioning !he Paternity
of Marital Children, 37 FAM. L.Q. 55 app. F (2003).
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since Michael Ir, American slates have varied widely on the norms for
disestablishing marital paternity, and more recently marital maternity, parentage
presumptions.n
The third precedent is Troxel v. Granville, where the attributes of parental
childcare rights were at issue, not who had such rights. 23 In Troxel, grandparents
sought a court order on grandparent-grandchild visits over parental objections.2"
In Iimiting judicial opportunity to oveITidc parental desires, a few opinions of a
splintered Cuurt recognized broad state lawmaking discretion in defining
childcare parentage. There was mention not only of child visitation laws
bencfitting third parties (i.e., non parents) via "gradations,"25 but also of possible
"de facto" parenthood?' a parentage establishment norm involving neither
biological ties nor formal adoption.27 Before and since Troxel, American state
statutory and common law childcare parentage have varied widely in their
definitions of de facto (and comparable nonbiological and nonadaptive) parents
possessing federal constitutional childcare interests. 28

22. See, e.g, June Carbone & Naomi Cahn. Marriage, Parentage and Child Support,
45 FAM. L. Q. 219 (201 I);
Gartner v. Iowa Dep't of Pub. Health, 830 N. W.2<l 335, 345 n.l (Iowa 2013). Recently, marital
parentage presumptions in childcare settings have been applied by some courts to lesbian
spouses of birth mothers, at times even where the statutes speak explicitly of husbands and
presumed bio!ogical ties. See, e.g., McGlaughlin v. Jones, 2017 WL 4126939 (Ariz. 2017);
McGlaughlin v. Jones, 401 P.3d 492 (Ariz. 2017); In re D.S., 207 Cal. App. 4 th Supp. 1088,
1097-98 (Cal. Ct App. 2012); Henderson v. Adams, 209 F. Supp. 3d 1059, 1079 (S.O. lnd . .
2016); TEX. FAM. CooE ANN. §§ 160.106, .201 (b), .204 (Vernon 2001) (presumed paternity
Jaws for men apply as well to women); Chatterjee v. King, 280 P.3d 283, 285 (N.M. 2012)
(fom1er lesbian partner can be a presumed parent under statute speaking to the natural
fatherhood of a "man"); ln re Guardianship of Madelyn 8., 98 A.3d 494, 502 (N.H. 2014)
(presumed "father" statute applied equ11lly to a woman). See also Torres v. Seemcyer, 207 F.
Supp. 3d 905, 914 (W.D. Wis.2016) ("husband" in hirth certificate statute should be construed
to mean "spouse" so that same sex and opposite sex married couples would be similarly
treated).
23. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 60 (2000). An earlier U.S. Supreme Court
precedent in a case involving a childcare dispute between a parent and a grandparent had
suggested there could he no federal law on establishing parental rights. Ex Parle Burrus, 136
U.S. 586, 594 ( 1890) ("As to the right to the control and possession of this child, as it is
contested by its father and it~ grandfather, it is one in regard to which neither the congress of
the United States, nor any authority of the United States, has any special jurisdiction.").
24. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 61.
25. Id. at 93 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
26. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 10 I (Kennedy, J ., dissenting) (recognized by J. Scalia, in dissent,
as a possible, but ill-advised, ''judicially crafted definition" ofa federal constitutional childcare
parent) (Id. at 92).
27. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § I 6-831.0 I ( 1) (2001) (single parent's "agreement" and
residency in same household can cslablish a "de facto parent"); Del. Code tit, 13, 8-20 I(c)
(exercise of"parental responsibility 'with' support am.I consent of the child's parent").
28. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Parness, Parenlage Law (R)Hvofutio11, supra note 11, at 752763. Of course, lhcrc can be additional state constitutional Jaw protections of parental
childcare. See, e.g., Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S. W.2d 573 (Tenn. 1993) (state constitutional right
to privacy in parenting decisions); Callender v. Skiles, 591 N.W.2d 182, 190 (Iowa 1991)
(state constitution has "a strong history of providing protection" to parentage based on
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While state lawmakers have broad leeway, their discretion to define federal
constitutional chil<lcare parents is not boundless. A few U.S. Supreme Court
prcce<lents do limit state definitional authority. Thus, all women who bear
children as a result of sex are parents at birth and thus have federnlly-protected
childcare rights. 29 However, not all men who, via sex, impregnate women who
later bear children have such rights. Men who impregnate by sex unmarried
women only have a federally-protected opportunity interest in establishing
parenthood in order to be heard later on childcare, with the establishment
requisites largely left Lo state lawmakers.30 Men who impregnant by sex married
women may be denied by a state any childcare opporhmity interest. 31 The
requirements for seizing federal constitutional childcare parent opportunities
vary significantly interstate.32

TII. AcrUAL INTERSTATE INEQUALITIES ON CHILDCARE PAKENTAGE
The broad leeway afforded to state lawmakers by the U.S. Supreme Comi
to define federal constitutional childcare parents has resulted in significant
interstate vanat10ns in both parentage establishment and parentage
disestablishment norms. 33
Parentage establishment norms go by varying terms, including not only de
facto parent, but also equitable adoption, presumed parent, and parent by
estoppel.34 The major requisites for establishment vary widely interstate, both

biological tics). Challenges to certain interstate differentiations have been shunned by the U.S.
Supreme Court. See, e.g., f n re Parentage of L 8., 122 P .3d 16 l , I 78-79 (Wash. 2005)
(recognizing common law de facto parentage in fonner unwed lesbian partner of unwed birth
mother, where birth mother later married the semen donor who aided in the assisted
reproduction birth), cert.filed., Britain v. Carvin, 2006 WL 263544 (U.S.) (urging that state
de facto parentage laws in I 8 states wrongly construe Troxel), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1143
(2006); Amy G. v. M.W., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d 297,308 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (no equal protection
violation in state laws that protect families raising wife's extramarital child, but not families
raising husband's extramarital child), cert.filed, Amy G. v. M.W., 2007 WL 683955 (U.S.)
(arguing equality necessary), cert. denied, 550U.S. 934 (2007).
29. See, e,g., Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (200 I) (no equal protection violation in
treating biologically-tied men and women differently in parentage laws on childcare).
30. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 256 (1983), (in most cases state laws determine
who has standing to assert possible child custody or visitation; "rules governing ... child
custody ... vary from state to state").
31. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123 (1989) (under certain circumstances,
biological father has no parental childcare interest even ifhe had earlier established a "paternal
relationship").
32. See, e.g., Mary Beck, Toward a National Putative Father l?egislry Database, 25
HARV. J. L. & Pun. PoL'Y I 031, I 057-68 (2002) (variations in state uses of putative father
registries in adoption cases involving required notices to and participation by unwed biological
fathers who door may seek to childcare).
33. Jeffrey A. Parness, r'edeml Constitutional Childcare Parents, 90 ST. JottN's L. Ri::v.
965, 1002 (2016) (critiquing U.S. Supreme Court deference to state lawmakers on who are
federal constitutional childcare parents).
34. See, e.g., Jefrrey A. Parness, Parentage Law (R)Evolution, supra note 11, at 75263.
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by lawmaker and by conteot..15 Similarly, state lawmakers use different terms for
parentage disestablishment, including rebuttal, rescission and challenge, usually
depending on how parentage was established..16 Again, as well, there are

widespread and significant interstate variations in lawmakers and in content. 37
The U.S. Supreme Court has the power to craft definitions of federal
constitutional childcare parents.3s With state terminations of established federal
constitutional parental childcare interests, the high court has already set
significant uniform constitutional norms 39
It cannot be that federal
constitutional childcare rightsholders necessarily must be left to state law
definitions (e.g., per the Tenth Amendment reservation of rights), especially
since other, very personal, familial privacy rightsholders, as with the abo1tion,4n
contraception,41 sexual conduct,42 and marriagc, 43 have been substantially
federalized through U.S. Supreme Court precedcnts.44
35. See. e,g, Jeffrey A. Parness, State Lawmaking, supra note J 2, at 495-504 (reviewing
differing approaches by state courts to tl1e roles of legislators and judges in establishing state
childcare parentage nonns); Jeffrey A. Parness, Parentage Law (R)Evolution, supra. note 1 f,
at 752-63 (reviewing differing contents of state childcare parentage nom1s).
36. Marital paternity presumptions arc typically subject to rebuttal, a tern, employed in
the much-followed Uniform Parentage Act See, e.g., UNJF. PARENTAGE ACT§ 4(b) (UNTr. LAW
COMMISSIONERS 1973) (paternity presumption may be rebutted by clear and convincing
evidence); UNff. PARENTAGE ACT§ 204(b) (NAT' L CONFFRENCE OF COMMISSION.1::KS ON UNIF.
STATE LAWS 2002) (paternity presumption may be rebutted only by an adjudication).
Voluntary paternity acknowledgments [hereinafter VP As] are ~ubject to rescission (before 60
days) and challenge by contest (after 60 days), norms are driven by federal welfare subsidy
policies found in 42 V.S.C. 666(a)(5)(D).
3 7. For the differing American state laws on rebutting marital parentage presumptions,
see, e.g., June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Marriage and the Marital Presumption Pos/Obergefell, /M UMKC L. REV. 663, 665-67 (2016) [hereinafter Marital Presumption Pos/Obergefcll] ("three distinct categories" to marital parentage presumption and its rebuttal). For
the differing American state laws on rescinding (within 60 days) and challenging (after 60
days) voluntary paternity acknowledgments, see, e.g., Jeffrey A. Parness & David A. Saxe,
Ueforrning the Processes for Challenging Voluntary Acknowledgments of Paternity, 92
CHICAGO-KEN'!' L. REv. 177 (20 I 7) [hereinafter Challenging Voluntary Acknowledgments].
These rebuttal and rescission laws are chiefly statutory with little room for judicial discretion.
The VPA challenge norms are guided by rather vague statutes, with much room for judicial
discretion (and with significant interstate variations though all rulings arc limited initially by
the congressional norm of "fraud duress, or material mistake of fact"). See id. at 185-203.
38. On how the U.S. Supreme Court generally should approach issues of federal
constitutional personhood in the individual rights arena, see Zoe Robinson, Conslitulional
Person hood, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 605 (2016).
39. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982) (clear and convincing
evidence needed to prove child "pennanently neglected").
40. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973),
41. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 ( 1965).

42. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).

43. See. e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
44. Granted, not all federal constitutional childcare rights holders have been explicitly
deemed subject to state law definitions. To date, the U.S. Supreme Court has not directly
addressed ch ii de are rights when children are born of assisted reproduction. See, e.g., Kimberly
M. Mutcherson, Procreative Pluralism, 30 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 22 (2015) (argues
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Nevertheless, for now and into the forseeable future, the definitions of those
eligible to maintain federal constitutional childcare p,m:nthood are substantially
left to state lawmakers. This has led to very different approaches to who, within
state government, define parents45 and how federal constitutional childcare
parents arc dcfined. 46 There is very little opportunity, due to federalism
principles, for the U.S. Supreme Court to speak, via equality (and perhaps due
process), to who within a state government should define childcare parentage,
since in-state separation of powers are left to state constitutional and
nonconstitutional norms. There is, at least, some opportunity for the Court to
speak to how federal constitutional parents have been defined in any state. State
law distinctions involving parental childcare must at least be rational, if not
supported by somewhat more signifi<.;ant (if not compelling) reasons, per both
federal and state constitutional equality principles. 47

IV.

LIMITS ON INTRASTATE IN EQUALITIES ON CHILDCARE PARENTAGE

As to the definitions of childcare parents, what intrastate equality questions
might soon arise for the U.S. Supreme Court, and for state courts, regarding
nonmarital, nonbiological, nonadaptive childcare parents?48 One such question
for federal constitutional protections of assisted reproduction, though distinguishing non-co ital
procreation between those wishing to procreate and parent and those wishing to procreate for
profit).
45. Compare Pitts v. Moore, 2014 ME 59, 1118-19, 90A.3d1169, 1177 (2014)
(plurality opinion) ("in absence of Legislative action in such an important and unsettled arena,
we must provide some guidance"), wilh Moreau y_ Sylvester, 2014 VT 31, ilil 25-26, 95 A.3d
416, 424 (2014) ("the Legislature is better equipped").
46. Jeffrey A. Parness, Parentage law (R)Evofution, supra note 11, at 752-763.
47. See, e.g., Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248,267 (state may not treat differently two
parents who "are in fact similarly situated with regard to their relationship with the child");
Nguyen v. LN.S., 533 U.S. 53, 60 (2001) (gender-based distinctions in childcare parentage
laws must "at least" serve "important governmental objectives," with the discriminatory
means employed "substantially related" to achieving these objecti-vcs). See also Symposium,
ls 1he Rational Basis Test Constilutional?, 14 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 347-575 (2016)
(includes nine perspectives). State constitutional equality demands can require more
significant governmental justifications for unequal treatment than federal constitutional
equality demands. See, e.g., Griego v. Oliver, 316 P. 3d 865, 880-81 (N.M. 2013) ("greater
level of scrutiny" in gender disnimim1tion cases than is required by the federal constitution).
48. Beyond childcare, there are other in-state distinctions in parental interests possibly
subject to equal protection challenges. See, e.g., Estate of Smith v. Smith Ex. Rel Rollins, 130
So. 3d 508 (Miss. 2014) (statutes differentiate parents regarding a child's interest in death
benefit recoveries under wrongful death and worker's compensation laws); In re Scarlett Z.D,, 28 N.EJd 776 (111. 2015) (statutes differentiate doctrine of equitable adoption parent in
probate selling, where it is recognized, and childcare setting, where it is not); Brooke S.S. v.
Elizabeth A.C.C., 61 N.E. 3d 488, 496 (acknowledging "the apparent tension in ... decision
to authorize parentage by estoppel in the support context ... and yet deny it in the visitation
and custody context"); Torres v. Secmeyer, 207 F. Supp. 3d 905,914 (W.D_ Wis. 2016) (there
can be no distinctions between opposite sex and same sex couples seeking birth certificate
recognitions); Seema Mohapatrn, Assisted Reproduclion Inequality and Marriage Equality,
92 CHICAGO-KENT L. REV. 87 (2017) (under Obergefell, challenging, under Obergcfell, private
insurers' distinctions in infertility coverage between married opposite sex and same sex
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arises in formal adoption settings, Lehr permits states to deny childcare parent
opportunities in an adoption setting to an unwed biological father who fails to
form a "significant custodial, personal, or financial relationship" with his child. 49
Yet such denials within any state cannot irrationally distinguish between unwed
biological fathers who comparably form such relationships. Thus, in formal
adoption proceedings, states should not be able to differentiate between an
unwed biological father who signed a putative father registry and an unwed
biological father who filed a paternity action, each before formal adoption
proceedings were completed. 50 Any such difference amount to the "sheerest
formalism. " 51
Comparably, state laws cannot irrationally distinguish between those
achic:ving de facto (or similar) parental childcare stan1s in adoption proceedings
(where any other parental rights have been terminated), as well as in custody
disputes with other parents.52
While Michael H. pennits states to recognize childcare parentage in the
male spouses (via presumptive paternity) of parental caretaking women who bear
children, such recognitions within any state cannot difkrently trec1t male and
female spouses of birth mothers. Now, both men and women can, in assisted
reproduction settings, provide the genetic material prompting births to their
couples).

49. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 267-68.
50. But see In the Matter of the Adoption of Jessica "XX," 434 N.Y.S.2d 772 (App
Div. 1980) (commencement of a paternity action by biological father did not give him any
right to receive notice of the adoption proceeding when he had not also filed with putative ·
father registry), affirmed in Lehr, 463 U.S. at 267-68. See also Heidbreder v. Carton, 645
N. W.2d 355 (Minn. 2002) (biological father's substantial compliance wilh a statutory putative ·
father registration Jaw was insufficient to preserve his childcare interests in adoption
proceeding), If not by federal constitutional equality, such a differentiation should fall under
stutc constitutional equality demands. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Parness, American State
Constitutional Equalities, 45 GONZ. L. REv. 773 (2009-2010) (reviewing American state
constitutionul equality nonns). See also Jeffrey A. Parness & Zachary Townsend, Legal
Paternity (and Other Parenthood) After Lehr and Michael H., 43 U. ToL. L. R£v. 225, 244
(2012) ("over twenty five years have passed since Lehr. The 'sheerest formalism' and maternal
choice continue to thwart many genetic fathers seeking legal fatherhood in adoptions."). Some
in Lehr did find Equal Protection difficulties in statutory distinctions between birth mothers
ofnonmarital children and biological fathers "who have made themselves known." Lehr, 463
lJ.S. at 27 5 (White, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall, J. and Blackmun, J.).
51. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 275 (White, J. dissenting).
52. Distinctions, if imy, should favor new de facto parents in adoption proceedings as
there they may only be adverse to strangers with no biological ties seeking to adopt. But see
Navarette v. Creech, 2016 Ark. App. 414,501 S.W.3d 871 (Ct. App.) (maternal grandmother,
who was assumed to stand "in loco parentis," has no ability under statute to challenge the
adoption of her granddaughter by the mother's probation officer); Daniel v Spivey, 2012 Ark.
39, ii 5, 386 S.W. 3d 424, 428 ("A person who stands in loco parentis to a child puts himself
or herself in the sinration of a lawful parent by assuming the obligations incident to the parental
relation without going through the formalities necessary to a legal adoption.") (employed in a
custody dispute between a biological parent and a nonparent who then achieved "in loco
parentis" status); Winn v. Bonds, 2013 Ark. App. 147, 426 S.W.Jd 535 (Ct. App. 2013)
(former stepgrandmothcr secured custody).
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mates. Iloth male and female spouses can have adultery result in childbirth to
their female partners. If lack of genetic tics within a state docf. not foreclose a
marital paternity presumption, it should not foreclose a marital maternity
presumption.5 l
A different equality issue a1iscs where state laws treat differently the
spouses in settings where children arc born of sex and children are born of
assisted reproduclion. 54 Equality issues, albeit perhaps even more difficult, also
can arise when married women, as surrogates, bear children bom of assisted
reproduction where the laws distinguish between their spouses who do or do not
consent to the surrogacy contract. 55 Mayhe here marital parentage presumption
i.n the birth mother's spouse can be denied though it arises in other birth settings,
as where adultery prompts birth, since only here are there intended parents
outside the marriage wherein the birth occurs.
Eqt1ality issues could be raised by one same sex spouse regarding the lack
of an oppo1tunity to adopt, or the lack of a marital parentage presumption, when
the other spouse adopts a child. 56
As noted, some justices in Troxel suggested there can be de facto parents
under state laws that are based on parental conduct occurring sometime after
birth. Such recognitions within any state cannot unduly deny equality to alt who

53. See supra, note 21 for supporting cases. Illustrative of differc11ces in statutory
language are the provisions in ALA. CODE§ 26-17-204 (2008) ("presumption of paternity"),
ARlZ. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 25-814 (2015) ("presumption of paternity"), LA. Ctv. Corn~. ANN.
art. 185 (2005) ("husband" is presumed "father"), the provisions in 750 ILL COMP. STAT. ANN.
46/204(a)(1)(2) (West 2017) ("a person is presumed to be a parent ofa child" if married to, or
in a substa11lially similar relationship with, the birth mother, except in a gestational sunogacy
contract setting), and D.C. Code Ann. § 16-909(a)(I )(2) (West 2016) (similar). See generally
Jeffrey A. Parness & Zachary Townsend, Procreative Sex and Same Sex Parents, 13 GEO. J.
GENDER & L 591 (2012).
54. Compare KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-2208 (a)( 1) (West 20 l I) (man is presumed father
of child born to his wife "during the marriage"), with KAN. STAT, ANN.§ 23-2302 (West 2017)
(child born of an assisted reproduction technique to wife is considered "a naturally conceived
child of the husband" only if husband consents to the "use of such technique"). These statutes
raise the question of why spousal parentage should depend on consent to assisted reproduction
when it does not depend on consent to adultery. See also in re Scarlett Z.-D., 28 N.E.3d 776,
at,i 67 (equitable parent doctrine for one not necessarily a spouse operates in childcare settings
arising from birth via artificial insemination, but not adoption (or birth via sex)).
55. See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.754 (West 2014) (slating gestational
agreement requires husband of "prospective gestational mother" to enter into an agreement
relinquishing "all parental rights") (absence of such agreement might prompt a marital
parentage presumption in the husband, per TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.§ 160.204 (West 2014)).
Why should the husband, for example, be a childcare father when his wife, via assisted
reproduction, delivers a child employing the genetic m;itcrial of hc:r sister and her sister's
husband where the sisters and the non birth mother's husband all intended tbe birth mother to
only be an aunt to the child? Seemingly, the ahscnce of consent by the birth mother's husband
might be treated differently where his sperm was employed lo prompt the pregnancy.
56. See, e.g., in re Marriage of Doty-Perez, 388 PJd 9 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2016) (denying
parental status to same sex partner, who was an intended parent at the time of adoption but
was foreclosed from formally adopting).
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substantially meet the state de facto parent norrns. 57 Some comts have already
found irrational distinctions in state laws that distinguish between men and
women who comparably reside with, and provide support for, children
theretofore in the custody of a single legal parent. 58
A more difficult equality (and due process) question arises when states
distinguish between residing and supporting men and women. For example, can
states distinguish between children then already having two parents and children
then having only one parent under law?59
Postbirlh (and occasionally prebirth) conduct prompting childcare
parentage can also originate in writlen parentage acknowledgments filed with lhe
state. Equality demands may permit a single state's distinction in allowing
acknowledgments by nonbirth mothers and fathers having genetic ties, and not
allowing acknowledgments by nonbirth mothers and fathers each having no
genetic ties.fj 0 Yet equality demands may invalidate intrastate distinctions
between acknowledging men and women with actual genetic ties, like when men

57. The norms are viewed in Jeffrey A. Parness, Law (R)Evolution, supra note 11, at
752-63.
58. Thus, while some state statutes explicitly deem only a man is a "presumed parent"
ifhe resides in the same household with a mother and her child and holds out the child as one's
own, state courts have read comparable marital patemity presumption statutes to recognize a
female as a parent. /11 Re D.S., 143 Cal. Rptr. 3d 918, 926 (Cal. Ct. App.2012); Henderson v.
Adams, 209 F. Supp. 3d 1059, I 079 (S.D.lnd. 2016). Consider also the legitimacy of the
differing treatment of de facto parents (and their children) in the Michigan interstate
succession law that distinguishes parenthood by when parental-like acts began or ended. MICH.
COMP. LAWS§ 700.2114(c)(iii) (2002) ("a man is considered to be the child's natural father
for purposes of intestate succession" if the "man and the child have established a mutually
acknowledged relationship of parent and child 1hat begins before the child becomes age 18
and continues until terminated by the death of either"). Cunsidei- a California statute on
presumed parentage for a nonb1ological parent that distinguished between one who did or did
not ever live with the chi Id. In re Jerry P., 116 Cal. Rplr. 2d 123, l 32-38 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002)
(such a distinction violates due process and equal protection guarantees as it allows a
biological parent and others to thwart otherwise established presumed parentage).
59. See, e.g., Bancroft v. Jameson, 19 A.3d 730 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2010) (recognizing a
new third parent would unduly interfere with the federal constitutional childcare interests of
two existing parents). Compare A.L. v. D.L., No. 12---07390, 2012 WL 6765564 (Del. Fam.
Cl. Sept. 19, 2012) (Delaware General Assembly contemplated 3 possible parents), and CAL.
FAM. Coos§ 7612(c) (recognizing there can sometimes be a third parent where two existing
parents relain their childcare rights), with In re Brooke S.O., 61 N.E.3d 488,493 n.3 (N.Y.
2016) (st.atutc "clearly limits a child to two parents, and no more th;in two, at any given time").
60. See, e.g., Jefficy A. Parness & David A. Saxe, Challenging Voluntary
Acknowledgments, supra note 36, 181-82 n.19 (reviewing the differing American state
approaches to possible and actual genetic ties underlying voluntary parentage
acknowledgments).
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in consensual sex settings can acknowledge while women in surrogac/'1 and
nonsurrogacy62 assisted reproduction settings cannot acknowledge.
Equality demands may invalidate intrastate distinctions between men with
actual genetic ties, like when men in consensual sex settings can voluntarily
acknowledge parentage (V AP) while men in assisted reproduction settings
cannot comparably acknowledge. V APs, and comparable declarntions of
intended parentage for intended parents with no biological ties, are particularly
important to those seeking parental status. VAPs and similar declarations are
easily and inexpensively undertaken, employing fonns that are filed with no
court proceedings (and no lawyers) necessary. 63
Further, equality demands may foreclose certain intrastate distinctions
between married and unmarried couples desiring childcare parentage status in
assisted reproduction setting where surrogates are not employcd. 64 As well,
certain intrastate distinctions in assisted reproduction settings involving married
couples seem dubious when dependent upon a particular fonn of consent,65 when
61. See, e.g., Frank G. v. Renee P.-F., 142 A.O.Jd 928 (N.Y. App. Div, 2016)
(male domestic partners arranged surrogate childbirth to a sister of one of the partners
whose mate donated the spem1; upon end of domestic partnerships, both partners
recognized as having custodial interests though neither could have signed an
acknowledgement). Query whether the nondonor was a biological parent per a
marital or marriage-like parentage presumption.
62. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Parness & David A. Saxe, Challenging Voluntary
Acknowledgments, supra note 36, 207-08 (suggesting new voluntary parentage
acknowledgments, going beyond federal statutory voluntary paternity
acknowledgments, to include "same sex fcma!e couples, who each share some
physica1 ties to the child (i.e., one woman donates ova and another bears the child)");
Leslie Joan Harris, Voluntary Acknowledgments ofParentage for Same-Sex Couples,
20 AM. u. J. OF GENDER, soc. POl.'Y & THE L. 467 (2012) (similar).
63. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Parness, Formal Declaration of intended Childcare
Parents, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. ONLINE 87, IO 1-04 (2017) ( urging use of
acknowledgement forms by men and women involved in assisted reproduction
births, though the fonns would be distinct from those employed by men in consensual
sex births).
64. Compare, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/J(a) (West 2009) ("husband
and wife" acting under "supervision ofliccnsed physician"), with N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 14-20-62(1) (2009) ("consent by a woman and a man who i11tends to be a parent"),
and WYO. STAT. ANN.§ 14-2-904(a) (2013) ("Consent by a woman and a man who
intends to be the parent of a child born to the woman by assisted reproduction ....").
65. See, e.g., 750 JLL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/J(a) (West 2009) (to be treated as
a natural father under law, husband must consent "in writing" when his wife delivers
a child born via "semen donated by a man not her husband"). No consent at all is
needed by a husband who is a "presumed" parent when his wife bears a child
resulting from adulterous sex (even if unknown to the husband). 750 lLL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 46/204(a) (West 2009 & Supp. 2017). The North Dakota statute on
assisted reproduction births (to both married and unmarried couples) comparably

requires signed consents, but indicates a failure of such consent "does not preclude a finding
of paternity" where the birth mother and man (not the seme11 donor) resided together and l1e\d
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several forms of consent comparably prompt only voluntary and infom1ed
assents.
Equality demands may prohibit distinctions in surrogacy settings, as
between wed and unwed couples,66 as well as between a couple and an individual
who employ a surrogate.67 Equality demands may also disallow distinctions
between those employing surrogates who do or do not contribute their own
genetic materials to the pregnancies. 68 Finally, equality demands should bar
differences between a couple and a single woman who employ nonsurrogacy
assisted re production.69
V.

CONCUJSJON

Per Obergejell v. Hodges, there is now interstate equality in the mairiage
opporhmities for all couples. 7 Commentators arc just now beginning to ponder
the importance of Obergefell for interstate equality for all seeking childcare
parent status. Yet, for now, U.S. Supreme Court precedents generally do not
demand interstate childcare parentage equality. However, the precedents do
demand certain intrastate parentage equalities. Federal constitutional challenges

°

the child out as their own for "the first two years of the child's life." N.D. CENT. CODE§ 1420-62 (2009). See also TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160. 704(b) (West 2014) (failure of husband to
sign a consent docs not preclude his parentage if husband and wife "openly treated the child
as their own"). Some precedents disregard the statutory "writing" requirement as long a~ there
is evidence of consent. See, e.g., in re Baby Doc, 353 S.E.2d 877, 878-79 (S.C. 1987).
66. As to wed and unwed couples in surrogacy settings, compare e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 742, 13(2) (West 2010) ("commissioning couple," means "the intended mother and father");
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B- I 5-801(3) (LexisNexis 2012) ("intended parents shall be married");
and TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § \60.754(b) (West 2014) (in authorized gestational agreement,
"intended parents must be married to each other"). See also Nonmarriage inequality, supra
note 2, 1254-55 (Obergefell "furnishes little basis" for challenging surrogacy statutes limited
to married couples).
67. As to couples and individuals in surrogacy settings, compare, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 168-8. 7 (LexisNexis 2010 & Supp. 2014) ("gestational carrier agreement" for "the intended
parent or parents"), and
i\Ju<. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201 (c)( 1) (2009) (unwed biological father of child bom to surrogate
with no mention of a second intended parent), with UTAH CODE: ANN. § 78B-15-801(3)
(Lexis Nexis 2012) ("intended parents ~hall be married"), and FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742. I 3(2)
(West 2010) ("commissioning couple" to surrogacy pact).
68. As to intended parents via surrogacy who do or do not contribute genetic materials,
compare, N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 168-B.8 (2010) (no express requirement for any intended
parent to be a donor), and Ur AH Couf. ANN.§ 78B-15-801 (3), (5) (LcxisNcxis 2012) (intended
parents should be married, with least one having donated "egg or sperm"), with N.D. CENT.
Com,§ 30.1-04-20( I )(d} (20 I 0) ("intended parent" need not have "a genetic relationship").
69. Intentions on parentage shol1ld be respected for all. On the availability of
nonsurrogacy assisted reproduction opportunities for both couples and for single women, ~·ee,
e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613.5 (West 2013 & Supp. 2015).
70. As yet, interstate equality in the marriage opportunities for three or more humans is
not demanded. For a discussion of how the prc-Obergcfell same sex marriage equality
precedents impact those advocating a freedom to undertake a polyamorous marriage, see
Hadar A vi ram & Gwendolyn M. Leachman, The Future of Polyamorous Marriage: Lessons
from the Marriage Equolity Struggle, 38 HARV. J. or- L. & GENDER 269(2015).
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to intrastate inequalities should proliferate as new forms of childcare parentage
are sought and as new forms of family relations proliferate.

